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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whenever I tell people that I am involved in the area of law and science, they become perplexed. 
They ask, “What does science have to do with law? Where is there any science in the legal field?” I 
want to emphasize the fact that science is everywhere. There is no aspect of the law today, whether 
civil or criminal law, where an education in basic scientific methods would not greatly improve the 
effectiveness of legal advocacy and policymaking. 
I have three objectives for my talk today. First, I will outline the various uses of science in the law. 
Second, I will try to describe some of the fundamental challenges at the intersection of law and 
science. Specifically, I want to address the question of whether law and science as institutions or 
disciplines are simply too far apart intellectually to be integrated. Third, I want to present some 
solutions to give you a sense of why and how the law can integrate science to some extent into its 
decisionmaking. 
II. USES OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 
Complex scientific issues arise regularly in the context of litigation, legislative debates, and 
administrative agencies. These questions have forced judges, legislators, and policymakers to 
reexamine the relationship between science and their work in the legal arena. 
A. Civil Cases 
Starting with civil cases, there have been three U.S. Supreme Court decisions since 1993 involving 
expert testimony and the admissibility of scientific or technical evidence. The first case was Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,1 decided in 1993. The case involved Bendectin, a drug manufactured by 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and used for severe morning sickness. The plaintiff claimed that 
Bendectin was associated with birth defects. The litigation went forward and one of the results was 
that Merrell Dow ended up pulling Bendectin from the market. Yet there had been almost no 
toxicological research and only extremely weak epidemiological research into whether there was any 
connection whatsoever between Bendectin and birth defects. 
The Supreme Court revised the standards for the admissibility of expert evidence in Daubert, holding 
that judges must serve as gatekeepers by evaluating the basis for scientific evidence before admitting 
it into the courtroom. The standard for admissibility of expert testimony before Daubert was the 
“general acceptance” test from Frye v. U.S.2 Essentially, the general acceptance test required a judge 
to determine whether the scientific technique used to produce the evidence was generally accepted 
in the pertinent field. Thus, all the judge had to do was to go out, find the pertinent field, and 
                                                          
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
2 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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inquire as to its general acceptance. If the field was polygraphs, for instance, she would locate a lot 
of people who did polygraphs and ask them if polygraphs are generally accepted. The problem with 
Frye then becomes obvious: it is similar to asking tea leaf readers, “Is tea leaf reading generally 
accepted?” Of course the answer will be that tea leaf reading is generally accepted. If you ask 
polygraphers whether the polygraph techniques are generally accepted, the answer undoubtedly will 
be yes. If you ask experimental psychologists if polygraphs are generally accepted, the answer will be 
no. Frye was problematic because it depended on the self-assessment of a group on whether that 
group’s own activities are valid. 
Without rejecting the Frye test, the Daubert Court held that the general acceptance test was not 
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 Instead of simply determining whether a scientific 
technique is generally accepted, judges now are expected to understand the science themselves. 
Daubert was revolutionary because it put an end to judges’ abdication of their responsibility to assess 
the reliability of proffered scientific evidence. Now, judges themselves are expected to understand 
the scientific method well enough to decide whether a particular technique is valid and reliable as 
evidence. This ruling has had dramatic implications for the judiciary. In fact, since 1993, the Federal 
Judicial Center and various state agencies have been holding seminars to help judges get up to speed 
on scientific evidence. 
The problem is that courts have been inundated by civil cases involving scientific evidence. The 
volume of mass toxic tort litigation has been overwhelming. There are claims involving asbestos, 
agent orange, trichloroethylene, Bendectin, silicone implants, lead, tobacco smoke, Fen-Phen, and 
latex gloves, and the list goes on and on. Surgical implants alone account for tens of thousands of 
cases. Over 500,000 silicone implant cases have been filed in the United States. These civil cases 
have driven a lot of the reforms in the trial courts. 
B. Criminal Cases 
While science was creating havoc in civil cases, DNA profiling came on the scene on the criminal 
side. Although DNA profiling turned out to be the most publicly debated topic, there are many 
other kinds of so-called scientific evidence that come into the criminal court. There are handwriting 
identification, bitemark analysis, ballistics, hair analysis, carpet fiber analysis, footprint analysis, and 
blood splatter analysis, all based ostensibly on some sort of empirical analysis. For a long time, many 
forensic scientists who dealt with these phenomena were able to get into court without having to 
produce any data whatsoever to prove the reliability of their investigative techniques. Now, however, 
trial courts are looking at this information more skeptically, as they did with DNA profiling. Courts 
are increasingly scrutinizing techniques and asking forensic scientists for data to support their work 
before admitting their testimony. 
Just a few months ago, the Massachusetts federal court excluded handwriting analysis on the 
question of identity. The forensic expert could not testify that the defendant matched the 
handwriting sample left by the perpetrator of a crime. The judge in the Oklahoma City bombing 
                                                          
3 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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case also was inclined to keep handwriting identification out after he asked if the experts had data to 
support their handwriting analysis techniques. What is fascinating is that if you start probing into 
what we consider as basic science, such as ballistics tests, you will find very little data to support 
widely-accepted investigative techniques. Forensic scientists now are running into problems because 
the courts are starting to ask more sophisticated and probing questions. 
C. Constitutional Cases 
In my new book, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law, I also discuss the Supreme 
Court’s use of scientific evidence in constitutional cases. We tend not to think of constitutional cases 
as raising empirical questions, but such questions are everywhere. For example, empirical issues are 
involved in cases claiming that capital punishment is racially biased. In Kansas v. Hendricks,4 the 
Supreme Court recently allowed states to involuntarily commit sexual predators on the theory that 
they will perpetrate more crimes. The Court, however, never even asked what error rate is associated 
with these predictions of violence. It never even considered the question. The Court’s opinion was 
just shocking in its ignorance of the scientific method. In addition, cases that involve scientific 
advancements will have constitutional ramifications. Frozen embryos, genetic screening, and genetic 
manipulation are some technologies that will raise constitutional questions. 
D. Congressional Uses of Science 
In addition to looking at how the courts grapple with scientific evidence in civil, criminal, and 
constitutional cases, I was also interested in looking outside the judiciary. I wrote the book in part 
because I was curious to see how Congress and administrative agencies deal with science. The basic 
question that I was trying to answer in the book is, how do you bring empirical scientific research 
into normative, moral, policy-based analysis? I was shocked to discover how poorly Congress 
regards scientific evidence and how readily it ignores science. I have divided congressional use of 
science into three main categories in the book. 
1. Big-ticket Science 
One category is what I call big-ticket science. I examine two examples of the big-ticket science 
phenomenon. The first is the huge project involving the construction of a superconducting super 
collider. The ultimate goal of the project was to identify fundamental, physical laws of the universe 
with the help of the super collider. Congress spent $2 billion to build a 14-mile hole in Texas, but 
then killed the project. The main reason they killed the project appears to be a lack of support for it 
within Congress. The reason they did not have enough support was that they did not spread the 
money around. Texas and Louisiana were the big winners, and every Senator and Representative 
who opposed the project complained because they were not getting any money for their own 
constituent states. One of the basic rules about Congress is that if you want big-ticket science to be 
done, make sure that every single state gets a piece of it. Otherwise, it will not get accomplished. 
                                                          
4 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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A good example of this principle is the space station. The space station project continues, at the cost 
of over $ 100 billion, because Congress distributed the money to numerous groups and no one state 
was favored. The human genome project is another example of big-ticket science. Congress pays 
attention, not so much to the science, but to the amount of money being spent and who is getting 
the money. 
2. Setting Moral Boundaries on Science 
The second area that I looked at in terms of congressional use of science is Congress’ role in setting 
the moral boundaries on science. When legislators see a significant technology emerging, they will 
want to impose their views on how the technology can be used morally and what uses of it would be 
immoral. Some of the examples I examine in the book are cloning, fetal tissue research, and human 
subjects research. These are areas where Congress likes to wax poetic about the immorality of 
whatever the science might be, cloning being a recent favorite. 
3. Oversight of Administrative Agencies’ Use of Science 
The third area of congressional use is really the biggest as far as Congress is concerned, although it 
involves Congress indirectly. This area is congressional oversight of administrative agencies, 
especially those agencies that deal with clean air and water. Here, I focus on the recent rules 
regarding particulate matter and ground ozone that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
adopted two years ago. This past May, after the book was done and had gone through its last edit, a 
mini-crisis hit. I was just relaxing one Saturday morning and reading the New York Times when I 
glanced on the front page of the New York Times, “DC Circuit overturns EPA’s rules on particulate 
matter and ground ozone.” Immediately I called my editor and said, “Stop the presses,” and I ended 
up having to rewrite the entire section dealing with the EPA’s regulations. It was an author’s 
nightmare. Interestingly enough, the D.C. Circuit struck down the ruling on the non-delegation 
doctrine, holding that Congress had delegated too much authority to the EPA to set standards and 
to do a cost-benefit analysis. 
E. Uses by Administrative Agencies 
I also examine directly how administrative agencies themselves use science. One of the subjects I 
discuss is the reintroduction of the gray wolf into Yellowstone National Park. There was a lot of 
conflicting biological theories about what exactly the wolf would do when it got back to 
Yellowstone. Opponents of reintroduction, namely the ranchers and the hunters, argued that it was 
going to wipe out the cows and the deer, and eat everybody’s cats and dogs. Not surprisingly, 
proponents of bringing the wolf back talked about the beauty and the wonder of such a magnificent 
creature. 
One of the things I get out of this discussion is the interaction between the administrative agencies 
and Congress. Congress uses committee hearings to beat administrators over the head to try to bring 
them into line. In this case, the gray wolf was protected by the Endangered Species Act of the 1970s, 
and the Act required that the federal government reintroduce the wolf into its natural habitat. The 
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Department of the Interior had control of that, and so long as it was controlled by the Republicans, 
they sat on it. They sat on it throughout the Reagan and Bush presidencies, during which time 
Congress tried to instigate action by requiring the relevant agencies to file an environmental impact 
statement. After Clinton assumed office and the Republicans took over Congress, the Interior 
Department became interested in bringing the wolf back while Congress became an opponent. The 
story ended when Bruce Babbitt took over and, seeing that the Republicans now had control of the 
House of Representatives, immediately let the wolves go in Yellowstone, knowing that it would be 
virtually impossible for Congress to get them back. The dynamics and power shifts between 
Congress and the Department of the Interior were intriguing. 
III. CHALLENGES IN THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND SCIENCE 
All of this is just to give some sense of how different entities-trial courts, both civil and criminal; the 
Supreme Court; the legislature; and administrative agencies-are dealing with scientific research and 
the integration of science into the law. In my book, I tried to get a sense of what the real obstacles 
are, and I identified four basic challenges that confront the legal system in its efforts to integrate 
science and the law. 
A. Unavailable Data 
One problem is what I refer to as unavailable data. Part of the problem with unavailable data is that 
there are very different timetables for law and for science. For example, legal liability for silicone 
implants had already been imposed before the first major epidemiological research on silicone 
implants had been conducted. Because of the time lag, the question is, what happens if science later 
determines that silicone implants are perfectly harmless? How do we turn back time in the law? 
Another example is global warming. We have to make decisions about global warming today, even 
before we are quite sure about what all the costs and benefits of each policy choice are. Legislators 
and policymakers have to make decisions under extraordinary conditions of uncertainty, decisions 
which must be made knowing that circumstances might change over time. 
Trial courts, in particular, have difficulty making these types of decisions. In the 1980s, people were 
convicted based on DNA profiling with three loci matches. That is, if a defendant’s genetic material 
matched the DNA left by the perpetrator of a crime at three locations on the genetic material, then 
the prosecutor urged that the defendant had left the DNA at the crime scene. Today, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recommends thirteen matches between the defendant’s DNA and the 
perpetrator’s DNA as proof that the defendant is the perpetrator. The question now becomes 
whether a person who had been convicted on the basis of a three-loci match now should be able to 
file a habeas petition to challenge his conviction because the FBI now requires thirteen matches. Do 
we go back on our legal decisions when science provides us with new information? 
Another problem with the unavailable data issue is that the law and science very often have different 
outcome measures. For example, post-traumatic stress disorder, rape trauma syndrome, and battered 
women syndrome are all diagnoses that were formulated as therapeutic diagnoses to help in 
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treatment. For most of these, there is virtually no research. The little research that has been done has 
been treatment-oriented research. The law, however, focuses on forensics, not on therapies. 
Therefore, acceptance of a diagnosis for a therapeutic purpose does not mean that it is also generally 
accepted for a forensic purpose. Post-traumatic stress syndrome is generally accepted by clinical 
psychologists, but not by forensic scientists. Nevertheless, the law often conflates these two, and 
courts fail to realize that they need to ask questions relating to the use of the science in the legal 
context, not in the clinical context. 
Similarly, what do we do with toxicological research involving animals? Is animal research 
generalizable to humans? Epidemiological research is also an issue. Epidemiological research looks 
to see whether the exposed population-those who took the drug, ate the food, or had the silicone 
implant-has an increased incidence of an illness. If the answer is yes, for example, that the incidence 
of disease is two times greater in the exposed population than in a non-exposed population, then the 
answer tells us something about the population. This, however, tells us little about any one particular 
plaintiff. Knowing that a community served by a contaminated water supply has a higher incidence 
of leukemia does not tell us whether a particular leukemia victim got leukemia because he drank 
toxic chemicals dumped into the water supply by the defendant or whether his leukemia had some 
other cause. 
Differential diagnosis is another subject that often confuses the boundaries between science and law. 
Medical doctors use differential diagnosis to rule out certain causes of disease, thereby permitting 
them to identify the disease. Lawyers, on the other hand, attempt to use differential diagnosis to 
identify the cause of the disease. It might very well be that doctors appropriately use differential 
diagnosis to identify a disease, but that does not mean that differential diagnosis can identify what 
caused the disease. In Heller v. Shaw Industries,5 Judge Becker made just that mistake. He reasoned, 
wrongly, that since doctors rely on differential diagnosis, the courts certainly should rely on it as 
well. The fact of the matter, however, is that physicians and lawyers rely on different techniques and 
data. 
B. Understanding the Science 
Another problem with integrating law and science is understanding the science. We have judges and 
legislators making decisions based on virtually no experience and no education in math and science. 
Laypersons in the legal system, such as jurors, have the same problem. How does a lawyer explain 
complex science to them? The adversarial method further complicates the understanding and use of 
science because it tends to polarize science. A litigator does not present middle-of-the-road scientific 
evidence; instead, he will present the expert at the end of the spectrum that best supports his 
arguments. He will put on the witness stand the physician who is sure beyond medical certainty that 
he is right. The result is that jurors and judges are given only the polarized views of the science. 
C. Integrating Science and Policy 
                                                          
5 See Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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The third fundamental challenge is that the issue of integrating science and policy just may be too 
big for the human mind. Maybe we are simply not smart enough to integrate science and policy.  
Think about the difficulty of integrating complex science into complex policy. The example I use is a 
case that came out of my clerkship. The Corps of Engineers wanted to build a reservoir outside 
Houston, Texas. The argument was that a reservoir would prevent drought and the problem of 
dislocation, and enhance navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife. The reservoir, however, would also 
harm some wildlife-it would replace certain birds with other kinds of birds and certain fish with 
other kinds of fish. Furthermore, as the Sierra Club argued, the reservoir would basically wipe out 
the oyster and shrimp populations in the Gulf of Mexico because the salinity levels would change in 
their breeding areas and this would allow fish and other predators to prey on them. In order to 
decide whether or not to permit construction of the reservoir, the Corps had to integrate the 
information about the likelihood of drought, the empirical effects of drought, and the economic 
effects of the reservoir on the area. There were also questions about the comparative values of 
certain species of birds, oysters, and fish. There are questions about the error rates associated with 
all of these empirical predictions. How should a court or legislator factor all these variables to come 
up with the right answer? 
D. Cultural Conflicts 
Finally, there are inherent cultural conflicts between the law and science. Obviously, among these 
issues are free will versus determinism, adversarial processes versus cooperative processes (science 
being a little bit more cooperative), and the law’s reliance on precedent versus science’s willingness 
to throw away precedent and move toward progress. These are some basic cultural conflicts. 
IV. SOME ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS ABOUT INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND THE 
LAW 
A. Science Cannot Prescribe Policy 
What do we do about all this? I try to offer some answers that may facilitate and streamline the use 
of science in the law. First of all, scientists should not be allowed to prescribe policy. Ultimately, 
legislators and policymakers need to understand the science well enough so that when scientists 
come to them with their agendas, they can separate the science from the ideology and make the 
proper policy decision. When, for instance, advocates of battered women syndrome lobby to protect 
women who kill their abusers in self-defense, the legislator is the one who must makethe policy 
judgment regarding the law of self-defense. The judgment is up to the legislators to make, so they 
need to understand how reliable the science is. 
One of the examples I use is Edward O. Wilson, one of my heroes, who is a biologist at Harvard. 
He frequently testifies before Congress on biodiversity and the environment. He is very honest and 
states at the beginning of his testimony that he intends to describe the effects of extinction on the 
environment, but that the legislators need to understand that his goal is to avoid extinction if 
possible. That goal is a value judgment because extinction is not inherently negative. It is an 
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outcome that we, as interested citizens, invest with value judgments that have nothing specifically to 
do with science. Unfortunately, most scientists do not state their normative policy preferences as 
plainly as Wilson. 
B. Error Rates are Matters of Policy 
Another basic principle is that the error rates associated with science are themselves a matter of 
policy. That is, we tend not to know anything with 100% certainty and that is almost always true in 
the science policymaking area. All applied sciences have huge error rates associated with them. Let 
us return to Daubert and Bendectin. If courts permit the litigation to go forward, Merrell Dow 
removes the drug from the market. If science later determines that Bendectin does not cause birth 
defects, then we have lost a valuable drug and society suffers harm. On the other hand, if we get rid 
of the litigation and it turns out that Bendectin does cause birth defects, then we have not allowed 
the plaintiff to recover and all those people who have suffered because of the defendant’s drug will 
have no recourse. Answers to whether or not Bendectin causes harm have an error rate associated 
with them. 
The other example is global warming. How should we react to global warming when there is a huge 
error rate associated with global warming? The temperature rise is going to stop, but when is it going 
to stop, at two degrees or at eight degrees? What if we spend hundreds of billions of dollars to avoid 
global warming because we think the temperature will rise eight degrees when in fact, it rises two 
degrees? Deciding whether to spend money to ward off something that may not occur or to take the 
risk of global warming is a matter of policy. 
As lawyers, we understand this gamble on the error rates. Take the burdens of proof in civil versus 
criminal cases as an example. In civil cases, we do not care about false positives and false negatives 
as is reflected in our very light burden of proof; we have not decided whether it is better for 
plaintiffs or for defendants to win. In the criminal context, however, we have decided that false 
positives are much worse than false negatives. As Blackstone said, it is better to let ten guilty people 
go free than to convict one innocent person. This is a policy statement by a policymaker who has 
decided that it is better to avoid locking up innocent people than to worry about letting guilty people 
go free. Policymakers must make these judgments because they are empowered to do so by our 
constitutional form of government. 
C. “Science Policy” Requires Scientific Knowledge 
Next, “science policy” requires scientific knowledge. Policymakers are getting the tools by which to 
understand the basics of science. The trial courts now have reference manuals and court-appointed 
experts to help them. There is a program being run by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science that aims to create a roster of experts for courts to turn to as court-
appointed experts. These experts will be able to assist judges both in understanding the admissibility 
of scientific evidence and in explaining to the jury how certain technologies should be interpreted. 
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Scientific advisory committees are already helping administrative agencies. Personally, I would like to 
give these committees more than advisory power. The Office of Technology Assessment, the one 
office that was empowered to give Congress in-depth reports on science and technology, was 
abolished by Congress in the early 1980s just to save money. This was a huge mistake since 
Congress needs to understand the science with which it is dealing. 
D. Obligations Under the Constitution 
That leads me to my final point, which is that legislators, administrators, and judges have an 
obligation under the Constitution to understand the science in the policy if they are making science 
policy. If they do not understand the science, they are unlikely to make very good policy. The 
bottom line is that lawmakers have a constitutional obligation to understand the science, and if they 
fail to do so, then they actually have violated their constitutional duty. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Science and the law are becoming increasingly intertwined and interdependent. Using scientific 
methods and knowledge in the courtroom and in public policy is very difficult, yet necessary. In 
order to meet the challenges posed by integrating science and the law, we must recognize that 
science is not to be confused with law, yet the two need to work together in order to achieve fair 
trial outcomes and appropriate public policies.  
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